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the issuance of the permit does not constitute reliable, probative, or sub-
stantial evidence which would support the denial of such permit.5
The court did not indicate what evidence would be sufficient to sup-
port a church's objection to the issuance of a liquor license. It appears
that a church is in no better position to object for moral reasons than
would be any individual party who held similar beliefs. Thus, the
proximity of the physical location of the church only gives it the right to
be personally notified of any permit applications of neighbors within
five hundred feet of such location. But, if the church has no ground
upon which to oppose the issuance of the permit other than the moral
issue, it might just as well ignore the notice. It had been thought that
section 4303.26 was passed purely for the benefit of the institutions
enumerated therein.6 It would simply aid them in maintaining their
dignity and respect in the community without having to go to court to
defend the same and without having to show material damage, which
might not be possible. Whether mere notice now can be considered a
benefit is highly doubtful. If a hearing is still desired, the institution in-
volved will have to go to great length and probably great expense to
provide substantial evidence which would justify a denial of a permit by
the Director of Liquor Control.
In view of the decision in the Corwin case, it can hardly be said that
the institutions involved are in a preferred position in objecting to the
issuance of liquor licenses. Looking at the statute one can only guess as
to what its purpose might be. At this point it appears to be little more
than mere verbiage. With the resultant sterilization of this law by the
Corwin decision, it is not unlikely that many liquor permit applicants,
denied a license in the past because of the proximity of their location to
a church, will seek to reopen their applications for further hearings.
Thus, a rather stable and well-accepted doctrine has been thrown into
chaos, and those who are affected by this decision are left in a state of
confusion.
JOHN R. WERREN
TORTS - ILLINOIS OVERTHROWS SCHOOL DISTRICT TORT IMMUNITY
The King is the vicegerent and minister of God on earth: all are
subject to him; and he is subject to none but to God alone.1
The King can do no wrong.2
These ancient tenets support the doctrine of sovereign tort immunity.
This doctrine, which honors the divine right of kings, reached its zenith
5. Corwin v. Board of Liquor Control, 170 Ohio St. 304, 308 (1960).
6. Meyer v. Dunifon, 88 Ohio App. 246, 94 N.E.2d 471 (1950).
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in Elizabethan England; today, nearly half a millennium later, it con-
tinues to flourish with pristine vigor in many of the states.
This is an odd and unfortunate history - one which in its latter
reaches has been marked by the obstinacy and sophistry of American
courts and legislatures. This obstinacy may be seen in the unyielding
adherence to precepts which evolved in the Middle Ages when demo-
cratic principles enjoyed little application. The sophistry may be seen
in the subtle but feeble abstractions which in some quarters have deposed
the original dogma and which are now used to disguise unjustifiable
"public policies."
The Supreme Court of Illinois followed neither of these objectionable
courses in deciding Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District Num-
ber 302.' That court, in a five-to-two decision, found that the doctrine
of school district tort immunity is "unjust, unsupported by any valid
reason and has no rightful place in modern-day society."4  The uncom-
mon boldness of this conclusion invites an examination of the case.
The situation which confronted the court was a familiar one. The
appellant, a school child, had been injured as the result of a school-bus
accident allegedly caused by the negligence of the bus driver. The trial
court sustained the defendant's demurrer on the authority of an 1898
case' which 4ad extended the state's governmental-immunity shroud
to school districts. After an unsuccessful attempt for reversal on consti-
tutional grounds, another appeal was taken to the high court, in which
the appellant forthrightly petitioned for the total abolition of school
district tort immunity. On this occasion the reception by the court was
sympathetic.
Commencing with a survey of the immunity doctrine's status within
Illinois, the court noted that the state had held itself open to liability
up to $7,500 for the negligence of its officers, agents and employees; 6
that the Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Disease Acts had
subjected governmental units, including school districts, to liability;' and
that cities and villages had been made directly liable for certain tortious
acts of their agents.' It noted further that companies insuring school
districts against school-bus accidents could not refuse payment on the
policies by invoking the immunity rule,9 the court observing with dis-
1. 1 BLAcKsroNE, COMmENTAIES *241, *242 (Lewis ed. 1897), quoting Bracton.
2. Id. at *245.
3. 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
4. Id. at ___, 163 NXE.2d at 96.
5. Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 IM. 332, 49 N.E. 536 (1898).
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 439.1-.24 (1957).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.1, 172.36 (1957).
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, 5 1-13,-16 (1957).
9. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 29-11a (1957).
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pleasure that this provision led to the unseemly result of granting re-
covery to one injured by a bus of an insured district and denying recovery
to one injured by a bus of an uninsured district.
The majority of the court was of the conviction that these legislative
modifications not only illustrated the random and inequitable conse-
quences of the immunity doctrine, but also revealed a disposition of the
legislature to mitigate its harshness."°
Passing next to a consideration of the doctrine itself, the court found
itself faced with the cumbrous body of metaphysics that sustains the
maxim that the "sovereign can do no wrong." Rather well-defined pat-
terns emerge from this intellectual scheme; the following are representa-
tive: the state can do no wrong because it is above wrong; the state as
maker of the law must be above the law;" the state, even if it commits a
wrong, may not be sued because no court may take jurisdiction over
that which has created it; since the state can do no wrong, it cannot
authorize another to do a wrong for it and, therefore, the wrongful acts
of its agents must be ultra vires.'
The court did not trouble itself with these theories; it brushed them
aside by reiterating these words of another court:
It is almost incredible that in this modem age of comparative socio-
logical enlightenment, and in a republic, the medieval absolutism sup-
posed to be implicit in the maxim, "the King can do no wrong," should
exempt the various branches of the government from liability for their
torts .... is
For the curious there exists a mass of scholarly literature devoted to
critical discussion of these legalistic conceptions. 4 In passing, it may be
mentioned that the arguments have something of a common ground of
attack, namely, the unreality of the logic which purports to liken the
democratic state, which exists only as an institution, with the English
king, who existed both as a person and as an institution.
10. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, __ 163 N.E.2d 89,
92 (1959).
11. Mr. Justice Holmes was a notable supporter of this Augustinian concept. In Kawanana-
koa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907), he said that "a sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends."
12. See generally, 2 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs 1607-19 (1956).
13. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, . 163 N.E.2d 89,
94 (1959), quoting the opinion in Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 88, 136 P.2d 480,
482 (1943).
14. See, e.g., Borchard's masterly analysis and discussion of the immunity doctrine in Govern-
ment Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-1925) and Governmental Responsi-
bility in Tort VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-1927); WATKiNS, THE STATE AS A
PARTY LrrIGANT (1927); Shumate, Tort Claims against State Governments, 9 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 242 (1942). For a comprehensive review of the immunity rule's status in the
various states, see Lefler & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1363
(1954).
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The purely mechanical deference which is today paid by the courts
and legislatures to these concepts leaves open to doubt the value of giv-
ing them prolonged attention. With the favorable solution of analogous
theoretical problems in the law of business corporations, the legal no-
tions supporting sovereign immunity may be said to persist today more
in sound than in substance.
On the other hand, the policy arguments which have been advanced
in defense of sovereign immunity pose questions of considerable impor-
tance. In the instant case, the defendant school district contended that
the payment of tort claims would be a wrongful diversion of public tax
monies set aside for educational purposes and that the discarding of the
immunity shroud would create grave and unpredictable problems of
school district finance and administration. 5
The first of these arguments looks to the "protection of public funds,"
and brings to play the "no fund" or "trust fund" theory which has
achieved a certain vogue in actions against charitable institutions. The
theory, simply, is that payment of tort claims from tax monies allotted
for educational purposes is a wrongful diversion of funds for an improper
purpose. The weakness of this argument, as the court pointed out, 6 lies
in the fact that it assumes that which it seeks to prove, viz., that payment
of tort claims is not a proper purpose. Inclined from the outset to view
damage claims as proper "purposes" for the expenditure of school funds,
the court, after analyzing relevant provisions of the Illinois School
Code," ' felt compelled to affirm these inclinations. Since tax funds could
be properly spent to pay premiums on school district liability insurance,
there seemed to be no convincing reason why such funds could not be
used to pay the liability itself in the absence of insurance.' 8 It was real-
ized that such a determination would have the salutary effect of ending
the grossly unfair practice of finding "liability" where insurance funds are
available and no liability where they are lacking.
The second of the policy arguments offered by the defendant had at
its core the contention that the shedding of the immunity rule would
bring financial ruin upon the school districts. The synthetic gloom of
this familiar argument is deftly exposed by these words quoted by the
court:
15. Molitor v. Kanelancl Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, , 163 N.E.2d 89,
94, 95 (1959).
16. Id. at -, 163 N.E.2d at 94.
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, 5 17-6.1 (1957) authorizes appropriations for "transportation
purposes"; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 19-10 (1957) authorizes issuance of bonds for the
"payment of claims"; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 29-11a (1957) authorizes the expenditure
of school tax funds for payment of premiums for liability insurance covering school bus op-
erations.
18. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 IML 2d 11, ___, 163 N.X.2d 89,
95 (1959).
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This argument is like so many of the horribles paraded in the early
tort cases when courts were fashioning the boundaries of tort law. It
has been thrown in simply because there was nothing better at hand.' 9
It is a fundamental principle running through the law of torts that
liability follows negligence and that individuals and organizations must
be responsible for the negligence of their agents and employees. Private
corporations have not met bankruptcy because of tort liability; rather they
have come to regard it as a usual item in their budgets. Adequate in-
surance coverage, they have learned, not only protects from untoward
contingencies, but also permits convenient adjustment to the administra-
tive problems incident to tort liability. No credible reason was proffered
to show that governmental agencies are incapable of making a like ad-
justment to tort liability. The court, therefore, rejected this argument.
Having been defeated on grounds of theory and policy, the defend-
ant introduced still another of the "horribles" common to immunity
cases. The argument was made that if school district tort immunity were
to be abolished, this abolition could only be effected by the legislature.
To this the court answered that immunity had been extended to school
districts by the courts and since they had "dosed their courtroom doors
without legislative help" they could re-open them without the aid of the
legislature?2
Next in question was the matter of stare decisis. The court appears
to have experienced little regret in departing from this doctrine. Indi-
cating that it is of limited importance in the law of torts, the court re-
solved that it must be passed over where new concepts of justice and
social needs impose a duty upon a court to reverse itself.2'
Not so easy of solution was the question of what application to give
the decision. Retrospective application would have brought great hard-
ship to the school districts, many of which were uninsured; a truly pro-
spective application would have reduced the decision to dictum and would
have denied the appellant any reward for his efforts, thereby eliminating
any incentive to litigants to seek the overturn of obsolete laws. To settle
this problem a compromise was reached by which the application of the
decision was made prospective except as to the appellant.22
19. Id. at __ 163 N.E.2d at 95, quoting Green, Freedom of Litigation, 38 ILL. L. REV.
355, 378 (1944).
20. Id. at . 163 NE.2d at 96.
21. Ibid.
22. Id. at , 163 N.E.2d at 97. The dissenting opinion described this compromise as
"untenable" for these reasons: that it was an "aborted" peculiarity supported only by thin
authority; that it imposed a hardship on the defendant school district which had justifiably
relied on the immunity rule; and that appellant was only one of eighteen children who had
been similarly injured in the same accident. Id. at __ 163 N.E.2d at 98 (dissenting opinion).
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With this final matter resolved, the end came to school district tort
immunity in Illinois.' The opinion of Molitor v. Kaneland Community
Unit District Number 302 lays bare an outmoded and, in current times,
a pernicious doctrine. Hopefally, its influence will be felt by other courts
and other legislatures.
GEORGE DoWNING
23. In response to this decision the General Assembly passed a bill limiting recovery to
$10,000 in any separate cause of action against a public school district or a non-profit private
school. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 821-31 (Supp. 1959).
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